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Abstract
Sexual violence during civil war and postwar in Afghanistan appears in different forms and contexts; however this 
article focuses on the most common types which are rape and gang rape. Combatants from all parts of the conflict, 
such as Afghan security forces, commanders, powerful figures and civilians (including family members) are responsible 
for these acts. Women and girls from all ages, ethnicities, classes and social statuses are at risk of sexual violence in 
Afghanistan. Sexual violence in Afghanistan appeared at the beginning of the war in 1978, when the Soviet Union occu-
pied Afghanistan, but it increased dramatically during factional war or civil war amongst Islamic Parties to take over the 
control of the capital, Kabul in 1992. This article challenges gunmen, law and tradition and introduces them as direct, 
structural and cultural entities of violence. In the meanwhile the effort and struggle of Afghan people and women’s rights 
activists continue to work for change.
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Violación sexual y violación sexual colectiva en la guerra y en 
la posguerra en Afganistán
Resumen
La violencia sexual durante la guerra civil y la posguerra en Afganistán aparece en diferentes formas y contextos; sin 
embargo, este artículo se centra en los tipos más comunes que son la violación sexual y la violación sexual colectiva. 
Los combatientes de todas las partes de los conflictos, como las fuerzas de seguridad afganas, comandantes, figuras 
poderosas y civiles (incluyendo miembros de la familia) son los responsables de estos actos. Las mujeres y las niñas de 
todas las edades, etnias, clases y condiciones sociales están en riesgo de violencia sexual en Afganistán; éste apareció 
en el inicio de la guerra en 1978, cuando la Unión Soviética ocupó Afganistán, pero aumentó dramáticamente durante la 
guerra entre facciones o una guerra civil entre los partidos islámicos para hacerse cargo del control de la capital, Kabul 
en 1992. Este artículo cuestiona pistoleros, la ley y la tradición y los introduce como entidades directas, estructurales 
y culturales de la violencia. Mientras tanto el esfuerzo y la lucha de los afganos y los activistas de los derechos de las 
mujeres continúan trabajando para el cambio.
Palabras clave:
Violencia sexual, Guerra, Posguerra, Muyahidín.
1 This article presents the results of an investigation conducted in Afghanistan in 2013 on sexual violence and war crimes committed against 
women, relying on fieldwork and academic experiences. 
2 Lida Ahmad: International Master in Peace, Conflict and Development Studies (Jaume I University, Spain) and lecturer at the University of 
Afghanistan (Development Department), E-mail: lida.ahmad.afg@gmail.com
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INTRODUCTION
Sexual violence against Afghan wom-
en has been a problematic issue during 
the decades of war in Afghanistan. Wom-
en in Afghanistan have been raped and 
sexually targeted during the war and also 
during the postwar years. Reports from 
national and international human rights 
and women’s rights organizations illus-
trate that Afghan women in all periods 
of conflict have been sexually abused by 
all parties involved in the conflicts. They 
were raped in their houses or kidnapped 
from streets and homes and then raped 
on military sites. It has been shown that 
women and girls from every age, ethnic 
group, and class have experienced sexual 
violence.
Sexual violence in Afghanistan ap-
peared at the beginning of the war in 
1978, when the Soviet Union occupied 
Afghanistan in the name of friendship 
and internationalism, but it increased 
dramatically during factional war or civil 
war amongst Islamic Parties who took 
over the control of the capital, Kabul in 
1992. Under the Soviet puppet regime 
many male and female prisoners were 
humiliated and demoralized by sexual 
torture; there were also some rape cases 
involving Soviet soldiers and women in 
villages. The issue intensified during the 
civil war with the rise to power of the 
Mujahideen3.
In the time of the Taliban, women 
and girls also were sexually assaulted; 
during the war in Shamali4 in 1998, the 
Taliban committed a massacre by killing 
all the men within the area and raping the 
women or forcing them to marry their 
combatants. In the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, 
the Taliban committed the same act with 
3 Arabic-Persian word referring to the people who believe they 
struggle for Islam and in the path of God.
4 Shamali Plain includes the Northern districts of Kabul and Northern 
provinces of Parwan and Kapisa. Most of the population in these 
areas are ethnically Tajik.
women that belonged to the Tajik5 and 
Hazara ethnic groups (see Afghan Map 
below). During that era, prostitution in-
creased dramatically; the Taliban sexually 
abused women in return for money or 
food to feed their families. 
Figure 1. Map: Afghanistan
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/afghanistan.html 
After the Taliban regime collapsed, 
rape and other types of sexual violence 
against Afghan women and girls was still 
a problematic issue. Currently, women 
and girls are still at risk of rape, gang rape 
and forced prostitution. They are forced 
to marry against their will, or their family 
arranges marriage for them when they 
are still children and give them as Baad6. 
Military commanders, powerful figures 
in the regions, gunmen7, government 
5 One of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan that speaks Dari.
6 Baad is a “practical way of carrying out a custom wherein a 
girl or a woman is given for marriage to a victim’s family by the 
aggressor’s family in order to settle the dispute or strife between 
two ethnic groups, clans, tribes, or even two families” (WCLRF, 
2008, pp. 17-18).
7 During the decades of war in Afghanistan many people have 
received weapons and funds from various fundamentalists or 
non-fundamentalist parties and now they have their guns. They 
have their own power and refuse the law and power of a central 
Afghan government. Gunmen in Afghanistan comprise all the 
people who have guns; they belong to the Afghan Notional Army, 
Afghan Police, and paramilitaries, or they are commanders and 
powerful figures like warlords or drug lords that have formed their 
own private militias, or they belong to a Taliban faction and other 
insurgent militant groups.
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officials, local communities or families, 
have been all perpetrators of these acts.
METHODOLOGY
In this essay I focus on the different 
types of sexual violence that occurred 
during the years of civil war (1992-1996) 
in Kabul city and also in the postwar time 
from 2001 until now. The methodology I 
use in this essay is a qualitative analysis 
based on documents and reports from 
national and international human rights 
and women’s rights organizations regard-
ing war and post wartime sexual violence 
in Afghanistan. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been 
involved in Afghanistan since 1984 and 
has released dozens of reports regarding 
various war crimes. However, only the last 
report of HRW “I Had to Run Away” the Im-
prisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral 
Crimes” in Afghanistan (2012), addresses 
sexual violence directly. In this report, 
HRW interviewed 58 women and girls 
in the prisons and juvenile rehabilitation 
centers; all of these women are victims 
of different types of sexual violence such 
as rape, gang rape, forced prostitution, 
forced marriage, child marriage and Baad, 
but they have been thrown into jail for so-
called “moral crimes”. Nevertheless, some 
other HRW reports focus partially on the 
issue. Thus, most of HRW reports related 
to sexual violence in Afghanistan are used 
in this writing.
Each year since 2009, the United Na-
tions Assistance Mission for Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) submits a report regarding 
women’s situation in the country. The 
UNAMA report, which is also a reference 
for this article, Silence is Violence: End the 
Abuse of Women in Afghanistan focuses 
on two issues: (a) violence that inhibits 
the participation of women in public life; 
(b) sexual violence in the context of rape 
at present (UNAMA, 2009, p. 1). 
The Revolutionary Association of 
the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) is a 
women organization that has fought for 
women’s rights, democracy and freedom 
since 1977. Equally, during civil war and 
nowadays, this organization is document-
ing war crime including sexual violence 
against women in Afghanistan. In this 
essay, RAWA’s documents and reports 
are used as evidences for analysis.
Furthermore, last year I wrote a thesis 
about sexual violence in Afghanistan 
within the framework of my Master’s 
degree in Peace, Conflict and Develop-
ment at Jaume I University in Spain. In 
my thesis, besides the use of secondary 
sources, I carried out interviews with 40 
women in the city of Kabul, Afghanistan. 
These women are victims of the war and 
postwar sexual violence in the country. 
Therefore, in this essay I will frequently 
refer to these interviews to exemplify my 
analysis although, in order to ensure the 
security of women, I use letters instead 
of their real name. 
BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF 
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviet Union led and accom-
plished a bloody coup on April 27, 1978 
and, on December 25, 1979 the Soviet 
army invaded Afghanistan in order to 
support its puppet regime. The regime 
named its coup a “revolution”, and any 
civilian who disobeyed was to be known 
as anti-revolutionary and was repressed. 
However, Afghan people from both cities 
and villages launched huge anti-occupa-
tion protests. People took to the streets 
with slogans while the regime used guns 
and tanks to oppress them. Those move-
ments were basically grassroots, but 
liberal and Maoist intellectuals played a 
significant role in organizing them (Wahab 
and Youngreman, 2007, p. 143).
On the other side, the USA adminis-
tration and the CIA, with the full collab-
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oration of Pakistan’s government and its 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), started to 
support the anti-Soviet Union and Afghan 
government groups in Afghanistan. They 
organized themselves into Islamic parties 
and began to call themselves Mujahideen.
After the Soviet puppet regime col-
lapsed in 1992, different groups of Muja-
hideen conquered cities and provinces of 
Afghanistan and they launched a bloody 
war in Kabul. Each Islamic party pro-
claimed their desire to take and control 
the power. Kabul city was divided be-
tween five major fundamentalist parties. 
Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) consisted 
mostly of Pashtuns under the leadership 
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and controlled 
the Southern part of Kabul. Jamiat-e-Is-
lami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Association 
of Afghanistan) was primarily composed 
of Tajiks. Burhanuddin Rabbani was their 
leader and also president for four years 
during the civil war. Rabbani and his fa-
mous commander Ahmad Shah Massoud 
dominated the Central and Northern part 
of Kabul. Ittihad-e- Islami (Islamic Asso-
ciation) was commanded by Abdul Rabb 
al-Rasul Sayyaf, a Pashtun man who was 
supported by Saudi Arabia. He controlled 
West and Northwest Kabul. Hezb-e-Wah-
dat-e Islami (Islamic Unity Party) was 
mostly Hazara and shi’a members, sup-
ported by Iran, and Ali Mazari conducted 
their operations and dominated the West 
of Kabul. Junbish-e Milli-yi Islami party 
(National Islamic Movement) was led by 
Abdul Rashid Dostum; Dostum and all his 
militants were Uzbek, and resided in the 
South and Southeast of Kabul (Human 
Rights Watch 2005, p. 5).
During the four years of civil war all 
these groups committed enormous and 
horrendous atrocities; in the first year of 
Mujahideen rule (1992-1993) 30,000 civil-
ians were killed. Around eighty thousand 
civilians lost their lives in all this period, 
and another 100,000 were wounded, 
while 500,000 fled from the city. Around 
70 percent of the city was destroyed, and 
many women and girls were kidnapped 
and raped (Wahab and Youngreman, 
2007, p. 202). Ethnic tensions were exac-
erbated because each commander used 
race to create tension; people who had 
lived peacefully for centuries started to 
consider each other enemies. 
Finally, on September 26, 1996 the Tal-
iban seized Kabul and the other warlord 
leaders and militants escaped from the 
city, mostly to the Northern part of the 
country. The Taliban rapidly imposed their 
strictest Islamic system: all women were 
banned from outside work and education, 
they could only go out when absolute-
ly necessary and a close male family 
member had to accompany them and, 
of course they had to wear the burqa8. 
This system affected more than 70,000 
girl students in schools and colleges, and 
basically overturned 25,000 families that 
were headed by women (Rashid, 2000, 
p. 50). By the end of its rule, the Taliban 
controlled over 90 percent of Afghani-
stan’s territory, and the Mujahideen were 
isolated in the Northern mountains. The 
groups that had fought each other for 
four years over power formed an alliance, 
called The Northern Alliance.
The 9/11 attacks that left 3,000 Amer-
ican civilians dead changed the political 
route of Afghanistan. The Bush adminis-
tration asserted that Bin Laden was the 
mastermind behind the terrorist attacks 
and that he and his frightful organization 
Al-Qaeda resided in Afghanistan. The 
Taliban regime was not willing to cooper-
ate with the Bush administration as they 
were not ready to help the USA.  Under 
the patronage of the United Nations (UN), 
the Bonn Conference took place in De-
cember 2001 where the “War on Terror” 
in Afghanistan was accepted as a military 
8 An Afghan traditional hejab, which cover head-to-toe of a women. 
Since the beginning of twenty century, the burqa gradually 
disappeared from cities, however when the Taliban emerged it 
spread again.
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humanitarian intervention by the adoption 
of Resolution 1386 of the UN.
Furthermore, the Bonn Conference 
established the transitional government 
comprised of anti-Taliban groups includ-
ing the Northern Alliance (former Muja-
hideen) and supporters of the former Af-
ghan King Zaher Shah. The main agenda 
was to expunge Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 
other terrorist groups and established a 
democratic government in Afghanistan. 
Women’s rights, freedom of speech, im-
proved security, efficient and accountable 
state institutions and economic progress 
were the aims of a new Afghan govern-
ment and its international supporters. 
Billions of dollars had been sent from the 
international community to achieve these 
goals (Wahab and Youngreman, 2007, pp. 
241-245).
However, after almost fourteen years, 
none of these aims have been achieved; vi-
olence against women, particularly sexual 
and domestic violence has increased more 
than at any other time, security remains 
fragile; each warlord group has guns and 
gunmen, which is an enormous threat to 
the central government. 
RAPE AND GANG RAPE IN CIVIL WAR
Rape and gang rape were widely used 
against women and girls during the civil 
war from 1992-1996. Human rights and 
women’s rights groups in their reports 
corroborate the issue of rape and gang 
rape in these areas during civil war.
Women’s survival testimonies show 
that during war in Kabul, systematic rape 
was used as a weapon of war against 
women. Evidence shows that militants 
rape women and girls to establish fear 
among people, to coerce them to leave 
their houses, and also to dishonor rival 
ethnic groups. S.G., around 38 years old, 
a woman who lives in Sher-e-Kona, was 
raped by a Junbish militant in the winter 
of 1993. Here is part of her testimony:
When the war started some of our neigh-
bors who had money left the area and 
went to a safe place or outside the coun-
try. But many people like my family did 
not go anywhere. Junbish commanders 
who controlled the area named Khosh-
hal and Smahel, they kept asking people 
to leave the area. It was a winter day 
when Junbish commanders gathered 
all the men and asked them to leave the 
area. People answered them that they 
do not have money to go. On the night 
of that day, around 10pm our door was 
knocked on and pushed open by force; 
ten or eight gunmen came into our yard. 
My father and brothers went out, and 
militants beat them. Two of them entered 
our room. My sister-in-law and I were in 
that room. My father came in and told 
them, ‘please anything you want I give 
you, kill all of us but do not do anything 
to my girls’. They pushed my father, 
they accused my father and brothers 
of being spies of Shura-e Nazar and for 
this reason we did not want to leave this 
place. One of the militants came to me. 
I had the Quran in my hand and asked 
him not to do anything to me but he lay 
me down and raped me. My sister-in-law 
fled to the basement. The other gunman 
followed her and raped her there. The 
day after, we left our house and for eight 
years we did not return (Interview with 
S.G., a resident in Shar-e-Kona, Kabul, 
June 1st, 2013).
More evidence shows that some other 
women in the same area were also raped 
on the same night by Junbish militants. 
In some cases it was gang rape. R.J. is 35 
years old, she was only 15 when Khoshhal 
a commander with his gunmen entered 
her house and wanted to rape her. R.J. ran 
to the roof and threw herself off. Militants 
thought she had died but her family found 
her in the morning when the militants 
left their house; she was in a coma, her 
back was badly fractured and she could 
not walk (Interview with R.J., a resident 
in Shar-e-Kona, Kabul, June 4th, 2013).
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38 years old, was gang raped during 
the massacre in Afshar. She told that 
Ittihad commanders arrested all of her 
male family member on the morning of 
February 12, 1993, and how in the after-
noon three gunmen came in their house. 
She was alone with her old mother, and 
they raped T. One soldier who beat her 
after the gang rape, told her:
Hazara Dokhter [Hazara girl], do you 
know who we are? We are Zulmay’s 
men [one of Ittihad commander]. We 
rape you and other Hazara girls so that 
all you Hazara remember us and dread 
us, and in future never want to be in 
power” (Interview with T., a resident in 
Afshar, Kabul, June 8th, 2013).
Human Rights Watch and Afghani-
stan Justice Project in their reports also 
talk about the systematic rape in Kabul 
during the civil war. A former Shura-e 
Nazar official in an interview with Human 
Rights Watch talked about the crimes 
committed by one of Shura-e Nazar 
commanders Rahim “Kung Fu,” and 
his militants against Hazara people in 
Kabul. He mentioned that Rahim killed 
many Hazara women and men and raped 
unknown numbers of women (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005, p. 57). The Afghan-
istan Justice Project writes in its report:
Every Mujahideen group fighting inside 
Kabul committed rape with the specific 
purpose of punishing entire commu-
nities for their perceived support for 
rival militias. Thus, rape, as well as 
other targeted attacks on civilians, was 
ethnically based. In many cases, it was 
used as a means of ethnic cleansing 
(2005, pp. 62-63).
Amnesty International, in its report 
about civil war in Afghanistan, docu-
mented rape and gang rape perpetrated 
by Mujahideen militants against women 
and girls in Kabul from 1992 to 1994. Am-
nesty International and RAWA’s reports 
clarify that massive and systematic rape 
and gang rape were used by fundamen-
talist militants as a trick and weapon 
of war against civilians. A 45-year-old 
Afghan refugee woman in Peshawar (a 
city in Pakistan) in late 1993 described 
the battle between Hize-e-Islami (most-
ly Pashtun and led by Gulbuddin) and 
Uzbek forces under the command of 
Dostum in the Deh Dana area of Kabul. 
The war took place in 1992 when she was 
living in Deh Dana; her place had been 
conquered a couple of times by each 
party in the battle. She talked about the 
atrocities committed by militants against 
the civilians of opposing ethnic groups:
These guards were only looking for 
Pashtun people, and would not actually 
kill non-Pashtuns. We were not Pashtun, 
so at least our lives were spared [...] The 
next day armed guards of Hizb-e-Islami 
came to us. They carried out a lot of 
atrocities. For example, a number of 
young women on our street were raped 
by them. One young woman was taken 
away by them and a few days later her 
body was found somewhere in the city 
(Amnesty International, 1995, p. 26).
Rape and gang rape were committed 
systematically and following orders; sev-
eral survivors in the interviews said that 
commanders and militants who raped 
them noted that they had the order to 
commit rape and other atrocities. N. re-
peated the words of Junbish’s militants 
when they attacked her house in Shar-
e-Kona in 1993: “We have been ordered 
that your heads belong to our leaders 
and your honor and property belong to 
us. So you have no right to ask us about 
anything that we want to do” (Interview 
with N., a resident Shar-e-Kona, Kabul, 
Juan 2nd, 2013).
Some survivors’ testimonies and 
reports of human rights organizations 
show that Mujahideen groups, regardless 
of ethnicity, treated all Kabul residents 
as enemies, because Kabul city, during 
the fourteen years of Soviet Union war, 
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was under the domination of the Sovi-
et-supported regime. The Mujahideen 
government in the first days of its power 
announced an amnesty law, based on this 
amnesty they forgave crimes of sides in-
volved in the conflict. Khalq and Parcham 
leaders who were involved in crimes 
against humanity benefited from this law 
and thus had the opportunity to escape 
from the country. Civilian residents of 
Kabul were considered to be the “commu-
nist enemies” by Mujahideen groups. This 
idea invigorated their Afghan and foreign 
leaders; for instance Rasul Sayyaf, the 
leader of Ittihad party in 1993 in one of 
his speeches through Kabul TV declared: 
“We want to destroy Kabul, because it 
was built by communists, and then we 
will build an Islamic Kabul”. Also General 
Akhtar Abdur Rahman, director of ISI (se-
cret service of Pakistan) from 1980-1987, 
who supported and led Afghan Mujahi-
deen during the war against the Soviets, 
said: “Kabul must burn” (Yousuaf and 
Adkin, 2001, p. 163). So, fundamentalist 
militants raped women in Kabul because 
they considered them as an “enemy”. 
As women in Afghan society are consid-
ered powerless and represent the honor 
of men, their status contributed to them 
being targets of rape. Mujahideen raped 
women in Kabul because on the one 
hand, they wanted to assault the honor of 
men in Kabul and humiliate them and, on 
the other hand, it displayed their power 
over people in Kabul and reminded them 
that they had been defeated for being the 
“communist enemy”.
Some interviews showed evidence 
that women were raped during the civil 
war in Kabul when trying to obtain their 
basic needs of life; women had to take 
care of their children and wounded peo-
ple, they had to rescue their family from 
the cold weather and hunger. Many wom-
en were raped as they were carrying out 
their roles and responsibilities as mothers 
or caregivers. In early 1993, S. was a wid-
ow who fled from her house in Shar-e-
Kona and was displaced within a mosque 
in Parwan province (North of Kabul). The 
weather was cold and she did not have 
food and enough clothes for herself and 
her children; so she decided to go back 
to their home with her male neighbor, 
so they could carry some supplies back. 
When she arrived at her house, all of her 
household goods had been looted, and a 
man named Na Nai was living there. He 
was a commander of Hezb-e-Islami. First 
she and her neighbor were accused of 
spying. After that, the commander raped 
her. S. explained that two other women 
in Shar-e-Kona experienced a horrible 
fate; when they went to get some of their 
needs they were arrested by gunman and 
after two days of rape were killed and their 
bodies were thrown into the street (Inter-
view with S., a resident in Shar-e-Kona, 
Kabul, June 5th, 2013).
A RAWA report says that on April 
10, 1996 a widow was gang raped by 
two militants when she was collecting 
firewood for cooking (2012, p. 268). P.G., 
a resident of Kabul lost her son when a 
rocket hit her house on May 24, 1996. Her 
husband Abdul Karim was injured in this 
incident. He was in the hospital and P.G. 
walked every day to visit him and bring 
him food. One day on the way home 
gunmen that belonged to the faction of 
Shura-e-Nezar raped her (Interview with 
P. G., resident in shar-e-Kona, Kabul, June 
4th, 2013).
RAPE AND GANG RAPE IN POSTWAR
As previously stated in the post-Taliban 
years, Mujahideen leaders and com-
manders came back to power with the 
support of the USA and NATO troops. 
Right away, the new Afghan parliament 
wanted to approve an amnesty law, ac-
cording to which neither the victims nor 
their families could seek justice from past 
crimes during the wars. Finally, “Parlia-
ment passed the National Stability and 
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Reconciliation Law in 2007, backed by a 
coalition of powerful warlords” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009, p. 51).
According to an official from the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), in the current conflict 
era rape is not used as a weapon of war 
against women (Interview with the official 
from the Office of the High Commission-
er for Human Rights (OHCHR), August 
12th 2012 in Kabul). The official states 
that despite the enormous number of 
rape cases around the country, there is 
no evidence that parties involved in the 
conflict (Taliban and NATO with Afghan 
security forces) use rape or other forms 
of sexual violence during their military 
operations. Other reports and documents 
regarding war and civilian abuse do not 
mention systematic rape in the current 
era between conflicting parties.
However, reports by human rights 
groups explain the dreadful rape cases in 
Kabul and other parts of the country. It is 
clear that rape and gang rape are not sys-
tematically used as weapons during pres-
ent military operations such as during the 
civil war years, (though present day com-
batants have committed rape and gang 
rape), but numbers of other elements 
contribute to putting Afghan women and 
girls at general high risk of rape and gang 
rape. Furthermore, in the previous period, 
the perpetrators were mostly combatants, 
wherein rape occurred during military 
operations. Now perpetrators are unen-
gaged combatants like commanders and 
their private gunmen, powerful men in 
various regions, police and other security 
forces, and non-combatants comprising 
family members, relatives, neighbors and 
civilians (people in the streets).
Interviews and reports by Human 
Rights Watch, Global Rights, and RAWA 
demonstrate that honor and revenge are 
the main forces putting women at great 
risk. Men are fighting each other and 
when they want to take revenge upon 
their rivals, women are the ones who pay, 
because, as we repeatedly said, women 
and girls in Afghanistan are still consid-
ered the honor of men. In September 
2005 Sara, who was a resident of the 
village Ruyi Du Ab in Samangan province 
in the North of Afghanistan, was raped 
by three gunmen. Now she is in Kabul. 
The rape had been ordered by a powerful 
local figure, a commander named Karim. 
He ordered the rape after Sara’s son 
Islamuddin refused to join commander 
Karim’s parliamentary election campaign 
in 2005. This is what Sara testifies. Some 
other reports say that the rape was the 
revenge of commander Karim after one 
of his relatives had been raped by Sara’s 
son Islamuddin (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, p. 36).
In another case several gunmen, who 
are members of the American-trained 
local police, raped Lal Bibi, an 18-year-
old girl. She was raped in her village in 
Kunduz province and now she is in Kabul 
asking for justice. Lal Bibi was gang raped 
after her cousin Mohammed Issa hid his 
relationship with a girl who is a relative 
of commander Nezaami, the leader of 
the local police in Kunduz province. Lal 
Bibi says that Mohammed Issa tried un-
successfully to elope with the girl; they 
wanted to run away because he failed 
to pay the bride price to the girl’s father. 
Mohammed Issa managed to escape 
alone and Lal Bibi was then raped. After 
this incident Lal Bibi’s family wanted to kill 
her because they were thus dishonored 
by what had happened to her. However, 
Lal Bibi changed the scenario by arriving 
in Kabul and asking for justice (Interview 
with Lal Bibi in Kabul, June 10th, 2013).
Six men raped seventeen-year old Gul 
Chehrah M. in her house in Kabul. One of 
the men was her cousin who wanted to 
marry her. She had refused his proposal 
and got married to another man. After 
four years the perpetrators succeeded 
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one night in attacking her in her house. 
They killed her husband and raped her 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 71-72).
In some other cases, women and 
girls were raped because they were in 
the wrong place at the wrong time or 
supposedly did a “wrong” act. Najibullah, 
son of Haji Mohammad Payinda who is 
an Afghan MP and ex commander of 
Junbish, raped a 12- year-old girl Bashira 
when she was outside her house (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009, p. 39). Two men 
raped A.N. when they found her in the 
night alone in one of Kabul’s streets. She 
had escaped from her house because of 
domestic abuse and forced marriage, but 
she could not find a place to stay and re-
mained in the street (Interview with A.N., 
in safe house, Kabul, June 10th, 2013). 
In the case of A.N. the court surprisingly 
accused her of zina (sexual intercourse 
by two individuals who are not married 
to each other) and sentenced her to two 
and a half years in prison. Now she has 
been released from prison, but her family 
refuses to have her back, they want to kill 
her. Thus A.N. is in a safe house. Human 
rights Watch denoted the court’s com-
ment about another girl who had been 
raped in the night on the street and the 
Afghan court also accused her of zina: 
“The court in considering A.N.’s case, 
wrote, ‘A woman going out, especially at 
night, is followed by certain dangers […] 
that women should know that it is unsafe 
for them to go out at night” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2012, p. 70).
Two other men raped Marya K., a 
15-year-old, in Kabul when she wanted to 
visit her mother in the hospital. She took a 
taxi that had another male passenger; the 
driver and the male passenger abducted 
her, brought her into a house in Kabul and 
raped her for days (Human Rights Watch, 
2012, p. 68-72).
In some cases rape is used as punish-
ment for the victim or her family. Eight 
men who were bodyguards of a powerful 
commander Haji Rahim in North Afghani-
stan raped a girl named Samia. Haji Rahim 
prohibits school and literacy courses for 
girls. Samia’s father, a poor farmer in the 
village, disobeyed this order and sent 
his daughter to literacy class. Samia was 
kidnapped as she was returning home 
and over the course of ten days eight 
men raped her several times. Samia was 
raped because she was the only girl in the 
village going to literacy class (Interview 
with Samia, Kabul, June 12th, 2013).
AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
FACE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
In the interviews with the victims of 
sexual violence in war and postwar time, 
and in a review of reports by internation-
al and local human rights and women’s 
rights organizations, three elements illus-
trate the factors that contribute to putting 
Afghan women at risk of sexual violence: 
gunmen, weak law and tradition. These 
elements have different origins, however 
evidence shows that many times these 
elements work together and support each 
other. For example, a gunman forces a 
family to marry their daughter to him with-
out the consent of the girl. He becomes 
the husband of this girl, and according to 
the tradition the wife has to obey her hus-
band’s demands; she must have sex with 
him even without her consent. During 
interviews almost all women who had a 
husband mentioned that their husband 
many times had intercourse with them 
when they did not want to. Some women 
said that their husband beat and punished 
them when they refused to have sex, or 
they were treated badly by their husband 
and his family, resulting in the husband 
choosing to marry another woman. In 
that case, the first wife becomes a slave 
to the in-law’s family. In Afghan civic law 
nothing is mentioned about rape within 
marriage, and it is not considered a crime. 
Thus, this form of violence is legitimate 
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within a tradition in conjunction with weak 
laws that do not come to defend victims.
I compare these three elements with 
the three types of violence in Galtung’s 
violence theory. Gunmen are the powerful 
men in Afghanistan who have guns; they 
probably belong to the Afghan National 
Army, Afghan Police, and paramilitaries, 
or they are commanders and powerful 
figures like warlords or drug lords that 
have formed their own private militias, or 
they belong to a Taliban faction and other 
insurgent militant groups. Gunmen are 
responsible for direct violence (Galtung, 
1996) such as rape, gang rape, forced 
prostitution, forced marriage, child mar-
riage and baad.
On June 10, 2013, the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commis-
sion (AIHRC) released a report, National 
Inquiry on Rape and Honor Killing in 
Afghanistan (2013). This report says that 
91% of sexual assault and honor killings 
that occurred in the last two years were 
perpetrated by people who are gunmen 
or that had a connection with gunmen 
(AIHRC, 2013). Interviews with victims 
from civil war time along with special 
reports (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Af-
ghanistan Justice Project, 2005; Amnesty 
International, 1995; RAWA, 2012) explic-
itly illustrate that gunmen and militants 
were primarily the perpetrators of rape 
and gang rape, forced prostitution. Also 
in the majority of forced marriage and 
child marriage gunmen were involved. 
Currently, even though militants are not 
the only ones who engage in sexual as-
sault, the power of the gun has a strong 
role in rape and forced prostitution cas-
es. Of the cases I interviewed or reviewed 
in reports, a majority of them involved 
gunmen having a direct or indirect role. 
Many types of sexual violence (forced 
marriage, child marriage and baad) in 
the current time occur because of family 
members or the community (elder jirga) 
forcing the issue, but the role of the gun 
and gunmen in most of these cases is 
very clear: numbers of women in the safe 
houses mention that after they escaped 
from their homes because of sexual 
violence, their family or in-law family 
enlisted the support of commanders or 
other powerful figures in their region.
Mujahideen leaders, with the money 
and guns they obtained during the war 
against the Soviet Union, each supported 
their own local militias and men that were 
loyal. Through these thirty-five years of 
war, these people have risen as pow-
erful commanders and figures in their 
respective regions. During the civil war 
they fought with each other around the 
country, and after the fall of the Taliban 
regime they came back into power again. 
USA and its NATO allies made a coalition 
with them against the Taliban. Now they 
are not simply commanders, instead 
they dominate all power structures in 
Afghanistan. Furthermore in the last 12 
years [after the Taliban collapsed] the 
Afghan government and its international 
supporters have been remiss and seem-
ingly disinterested in pursuing justice 
and rule of law. People who are being 
linked to war crimes occupy power. This 
condition puts Afghan women and girls 
at the highest risk of violence and par-
ticularly sexual violence.
The Afghan Constitution that was 
adopted in 2004 is, on paper, strongly 
supportive of human rights and women’s 
rights (Constitution, Art. 7.22). However, 
the Afghan Civil Law (Civil Code) adopt-
ed in 1977 and the Afghan Penal Code 
adopted in 1976 are still existent and 
legal throughout the country though 
they are too vague, outdated, and do 
not have sufficient clarification regarding 
women’s rights. These documents can-
not defend and protect Afghan women 
from violence and particularly sexual 
violence. Afghan law and its judicial sys-
tem work as a form of structural violence 
against women. For example, according 
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to Afghan Civil Law, a man can have 
more than one wife at the same time. 
Although this law specifies three condi-
tions for a man who wants to marry again 
(Civil Law, Art. 87), these conditions are 
not so difficult and complicated: a man 
can easily manage a way around them. 
Secondly, these conditions mentioned 
are private and occur in private spaces 
(home) and no one, not even the law, 
can verify their existence. Additionally, 
Civil Law in some ways gives rights for 
a male family member to carry out child 
marriage and forced marriage; Civil Law 
article 70 specifies the age of marriage 
for a girl as 16, however article number 
71 says if the girl is under age 16 her 
father has the right to marry her off (Civil 
Law, Art. 70-71).
In the Afghan Penal Code, there is 
confusion between zina and rape. The 
article 426 of the Penal Code defines 
zina as sexual intercourse between a 
man and woman who are not married. 
Zina is a criminal offense according to 
Afghan law, and both man and woman 
are to be punished if they have a sexual 
relationship outside of marriage (Afghan 
Penal Code. Art. 426). Article 429 of the 
Penal Code says that if the sexual in-
tercourse occurs through violence and 
threat, it is rape (Afghan Penal Code. Art. 
429). This perfunctory definition of rape 
is very tricky and causes a quandary; it 
is not difficult for a rapist to claim that 
intercourse was done voluntarily and 
not through violence, thereby marking 
the woman as a “sinner” instead of a 
victim requiring protection. At the same 
time, four male Muslims must be present 
in court to show proof of the rape act, 
which in most cases is impossible. Thus, 
it is not surprising that according to the 
Human Rights Watch’s report around 
400 women (HRW, 2012, p. 3) who are 
victims of rape must survive now in a Ka-
bul jail as culprits of zina. Human Rights 
Watch writes in this report:
[…] police often treat a report of rape 
as an admission of zina, arresting the 
victim along with the perpetrator. Many 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges 
accept a mere counter-allegation of 
consensual sex to trump a complaint of 
rape and transform it into a complaint 
of zina, instead of treating consent as a 
defense that can be pleaded by a per-
son accused of rape during a criminal 
investigation or trial. (HRW, 2012, p. 37).
Article 430 of the Penal Code assess-
es punishment for persons who force 
women to be prostitutes, however many 
women and girls who are victims of this 
act are blamed by police, sentenced 
for zina and then imprisoned. United 
Nations Population Fund (UNPFA) in the 
report Police Taking Action on Violence 
Against Women in Afghanistan 2011, 
alleges that “[t]his attitude and approach 
of police leads to very low reporting of 
victims of violence to the state agencies 
and reluctance of victims to file criminal 
charges” (UNPFA, 2011, p. 62).
On top of all this, in the Afghan Penal 
Code forced marriage, child marriage 
and baad are only forbidden but not pun-
ished so no accountability is demanded 
from the perpetrator. Therefore, it gives 
a free hand to anyone to continue these 
acts.
Women’s rights activists in Afghan-
istan are aware of these gaps and de-
fects in Afghan Civil Law and the Penal 
Code. They prepared the Law on the 
Elimination of Violence against Woman 
(EVAW), and President Karzai approved 
it on July 20, 2009, while the Afghan 
parliament was on its summer holidays9. 
Although there are still many contro-
versial instances, at least this law has 
provided much clarification regarding 
gender-based violence and sexual vio-
lence. This law has a more specific and 
clear definition of sexual violence and 
9 According to the Afghan constitution 
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openly bans rape, forced prostitution, 
forced marriage, child marriage and 
baad. Furthermore, this document spec-
ifies the state’s different institutions that 
must take action to stop and enact pre-
vention of violence against women (Law 
on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women, 2009). However, there is a 
general problem in Afghanistan, as with 
all societies experiencing war or those 
that are recently entering postwar, that 
the rule of law is very weak. Thus the 
realization of this law in the real lives of 
women is not easy. Rahima Rezae, head 
of family court in Kabul says: “the ‘Law 
on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women’ is still not officially recognized 
and no Afghan court uses this law to 
deal with cases of sexual violence” (In-
terview with Rahima Razai, Kabul, May 
22nd, 2013).
On June 1st, 2013 the Law on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women 
was discussed in the Afghan parliament 
session; however the conservative 
parliamentary members disagreed 
with some articles of this law, and they 
found it contradictory to Sharia law. 
Article 23 of EVAW says: “If a person 
beats a woman which does not result 
in damages and injury, the offender in 
view of the circumstances shall be sen-
tenced to the short term imprisonment 
not more than one month” (EVAW law, 
article 23, p. 25). Some parliamenta-
ry members claim this part is against 
Sharia law, because if beating does not 
damage and injure the woman there is 
no punishment for that in Islam. Article 
27 condemns any personal act that pro-
hibits a woman from marrying, article 
26 prohibits forced marriage and 37 
condemns polygamy; all these articles 
were refuted by the Afghan parliament, 
saying these contradict Islam. Thus, 
here religion is used to legitimatize di-
rect violence and so is a form of cultural 
violence.
ACTION TO STOP AND PREVENT 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
Under the most violent conditions it is 
possible to find and meet some actions 
that can terminate violence and trans-
form it into peace. When we look at war 
we see men and women that perpetrate 
violence; however in the meanwhile there 
still exists men and women in the war and 
postwar years that endeavor for peace 
and try to stop violence. We talk here 
primarily about those peace actions that 
are collective and more organized. For 
sure, these types of actions are calcula-
ble and have stable and comprehensive 
results. Nevertheless we cannot disre-
gard individual efforts for peace and the 
ending of violence. Many people during 
war operate their competencies and ca-
pacities to organize their relationships in 
peaceful ways.
During my interviews with victims 
of sexual violence in the Afshar district, 
everyone talked about the action of three 
neighbors during the massacre in the 
area. These three families were non-Haz-
ara residents in Afshar at that time; two of 
them were Pashtuns and one family was 
Shamali (Tajik). In the Afshar massacre 
Ittihad militants (Pashtuns) and Jamiat and 
Shura-e Nazar militants (Tajiks) targeted 
Hazara and shi’a people. Commanders 
and militants would only enter Hazara 
houses. Non-Hazaras were safe. So, these 
three families hid many Hazara people 
in their house. They told militants that 
these families had earlier escaped from 
Afshar (Interview with L. S., a resident in 
Afshar, Kabul, June 11th, 2013). M. O., the 
Pashtun resident who saved the lives of 
a number of his Hazara neighbors says:
I asked all my neighbors to send their 
women and girls to our house; I can see 
most violation but raping and other se-
xual assault on women or young girls is 
impossible to accept. How I should have 
accepted, they were Hazara women and 
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girls but I knew them. They are like my 
sisters and daughters (Interview with 
M. O, a resident. in Afshar, Kabul, June 
13th, 2013).
Saber, a Tajik resident whose father 
gave safe haven for Hazara women men-
tioned that he was a 7-year-old boy when 
the Afshar massacre occurred. Saber 
remembers his father’s effort to rescue 
other people, saying:
When Shura-e Nazar militants came in 
our door, my father told them that we 
are from Shamali, militants accepted 
and went away. But in the evening Ittihad 
militants came and they told my father 
that they know some Hazara are in our 
house. My father told them if they want 
to enter first they should kill him. Mili-
tants got angry and beat on my father’s 
chest with guns, but they did not enter 
our house (Interview with Saber, a resi-
dent in Afshar, Kabul, June 13th, 2013).
Evidence also shows the help of doc-
tors, aid workers and civilians after they 
had been raped. After the fall of Taliban 
the new situation gave opportunity to 
some women’s rights activists and NGOs 
to work more systematically and seriously 
against sexual violence in Afghanistan. 
Some of these people and groups took 
radical action and in their speeches and 
statements asked openly for justice, 
accusing Mujahideen leaders who were 
responsible for the civil war and violence 
including sexual violence against wom-
en. Malalai Joya is one of the Afghan 
women who arrived as a representative 
from Farah province in the loya jirga of 
2003. Joya demonstrated against the 
presence of Mujahideen leaders in the 
loya jirga and said that these leaders are 
criminals and rapists of Afghan women, 
that Afghanistan cannot establish a de-
mocracy and promote women’s rights 
with a government full of these criminals 
(Interview with Malalai Joya, Kabul, June 
19th, 2013). Joya became a heroine for 
the Afghan people. She was elected to the 
first Afghan parliament in 2005 where her 
strong speeches in support of women’s 
rights in the parliament prompted other 
conservative members to oust her from 
parliament in 2007. After that time she 
became a peace activist, and one of her 
efforts is to help and assist Afghan wom-
en and girls who are victims of sexual 
violence.
Samia, who was raped by eight men 
that were bodyguards of a powerful com-
mander Haji Rahim in North Afghanistan, 
says after she was raped nobody believed 
her. Haji Rhim has since lost power. He 
accused Samia of zina and put her in jail 
for some days. Samia was released from 
jail and Joya met both her and Bashira, 
another girl who had been raped by Na-
jibullah, son of Haji Mohammad Payinda, 
and an Afghan MP and ex commander 
of Junbish. Samia says neither she nor 
Bashira had any hope but Joya’s message 
was very strong and supportive for them. 
Joya offered her bodyguards and house 
to protect both. Joya says: “I tried to 
change Samia’s and Bashira’s feeling and 
energy; they feel themselves to be victims 
without power. They put all their energy 
into crying and self-blame. I encouraged 
them to raise their voices, not to feel 
shame but to be strong” (Interview with 
Malalai Joya, Kabul, June 19th, 2013).
When I interviewed Samia she was 
hopeless because of her case in the Af-
ghan court. She said that only two of her 
rapists were jailed for a short time, but 
then released without her consent, and 
the others were never arrested. This is 
due to the fact that commander Rahim 
has more power now. However this 
does not hamper her. Her hope is to 
establish a school for girls in her village 
and raise awareness about women’s 
rights and justice (Interview with Samia, 
Kabul, June 12th, 2013).
RAWA is one of the oldest women’s 
organizations, established in 1977. 
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RAWA has documented the violence 
against women including sexual vio-
lence since the Soviet invasion and the 
civil war. RAWA, through their magazine, 
webpage, and other social networks, 
established awareness around the world 
about the pain of Afghan women; RA-
WA’s activity during the civil war and 
Taliban time was particularly significant. 
They collected hundreds of rape, gang 
rape, forced prostitution, forced mar-
riage and child marriage cases when 
hardly any media anywhere in the world 
was paying attention to Afghanistan. 
At the current time, RAWA’s webpage 
continues to keep the world informed 
about the story of women and girls who 
are victims of sexual violence. A RAWA 
member says:
We always try to be the voice of voice-
less! Women and girls who are raped 
or sexually abused are forced to be si-
lent; on one hand Afghan conservative 
society blames women for all sexual 
acts. In many cases society justifies 
the rapist’s act, they accuse women, 
saying that they were in the wrong place 
at the wrong time or women dress in 
such clothes that provoke men to rape 
them. On the other hand the patriarchal 
system supports and maintains this 
culture through their political represen-
tatives who in Afghanistan represent 
fundamentalists groups (Interview 
with RAWA member, Kabul, June 18th, 
2013).
RAWA, besides providing worldwide 
awareness about sexual violence in Af-
ghanistan, helps to raise consciousness 
among victims and empowers them to 
struggle to achieve justice and women’s 
rights. RAWA believes: “we cannot only 
fight to stop rape and sexual violence, 
if we want to end sexual violence and 
violence at all in Afghanistan, it needs 
a political and cultural struggle through 
Afghan women” (Interview with RAWA 
member, Kabul, June 18th, 2013). RAWA 
establishes underground classes for 
women and girls to empower them.
Some women’s groups and NGOs 
are offering humanitarian facilities for 
sexual violence victims, such as safe 
houses and advocacy. Humanitarian 
Assistance for the Women and Children 
of Afghanistan (HAWCA) under the direc-
torate of Salay Ghafar and some other 
women’s rights activists established a 
safe house for sexual and gender-based 
violence victims in early 2004. HAW-
CA was the first women’s organization 
that took initiatives and despite serious 
threats provides a safe place including 
advocacy, psychological treatment and 
literacy classes for women victims. After 
HAWCA several women’s organizations 
have started to provide a safe house for 
women, not only in Kabul but also in a 
number of provinces like Mazar-e-Sharif, 
Herat, Bamyan, Kunduz, Badakhshan, 
Sarpu and Jalalabad (Interview with Sa-
lay Ghafar, Kabul, June 20th, 2013).
Now there are twelve safe houses 
run by women’s activists in Afghanistan; 
seven of these houses working under the 
administration of Women for Women. 
Manizha Naderi, director of the women’s 
organization claims that the main con-
cern that has driven her to establish safe 
houses was the pain of sexual violence 
victims. Naderi states: “young girls and 
women raped by commanders and para-
militaries got no assistance from the Af-
ghan government that is very weak and 
unmotivated to ask for justice for these 
victims. Thus, it is the responsibility of 
civil society to defend women’s rights” 
(Interview with Manizha Naderi, Kabul, 
June 19th, 2013).
CONCLUSION
Gender relations in the country were 
formed mostly under two institutions: 
religious and tribal traditions. Women 
are considered part of the honor of the 
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family, tribe and community. Men have 
the responsibility as protector of women, 
homeland and treasure. Some other trib-
al norms and traditions isolated women 
from the public sphere and female bod-
ies were considered as a kind of wealth 
to protect. The honor of the community 
and isolation from public space created 
a typical masculine patriarchal society 
that put Afghan women at high risk of 
violence and sexual violence.
Evidence and reports illustrate that 
sexual violence was present in the de-
cades of war and now in the postwar 
era in Afghanistan. During the civil war 
in Kabul city from 1992 to 1996 unknown 
numbers of women and girls were sexu-
ally abused. Some districts of Kabul city 
were more affected by war; Shar-e-Kona 
and Afshar are examples of these. They 
are areas that witnessed mass rape and 
other forms of sexual violence. The dark 
phenomenon of rape and sexual violence 
arrived in postwar time as well; numbers 
of Afghan women victims of sexual vio-
lence are surviving in safe houses.
Evidence and reports illustrate that 
sexual violence was present in the de-
cades of war and now in the postwar 
era in Afghanistan. During the civil war 
in Kabul city from 1992 to 1996 unknown 
numbers of women and girls were sex-
ually abused. Some districts of Kabul 
city were more affected by war. They 
are areas that witnessed mass rape and 
other forms of sexual violence. The dark 
phenomenon of rape and sexual violence 
arrived in postwar time as well; numbers 
of Afghan women victims of sexual vio-
lence are surviving in safe houses.
Meanwhile Afghan women, despite 
the enormous barriers and oppression, 
have tried to participate in political, social 
and economic activities. Afghan women, 
whether in a political or social movement 
or whether individually have been rais-
ing their voices against oppression and 
misogynistic action.
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